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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
---oooOooo--HARRY MILLER,
Petitioner and Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF UTAH ,
Defendant and Appellee.

:
:
:
:
Appeal No. 20080921-CA
:
:
:
:
:
---oooOooo---

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(f).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Rule 12(b)(6) U.R.C.P. allows dismissals only when Plaintiff has failed to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff has met the basic requirements
of the statue governing these actions, Utah Code Ann., § 78B-9-402. Plaintiff has
asserted that he was factually innocent, based upon evidence that he was not in the
State of Utah at the time the crime was committed. He has also shown that some of
1

the evidence in that regard was obtained after the original trial, and could not have
been discovered through due diligence prior to trial. Plaintiff’s allegations are
sufficient to avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), and the dismissal should be
reversed.
Pursuant to Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 364 (Utah 1995), the
standard or review in this matter is that the factual allegations are accepted as true,
and all reasonable inferences are drawn from them in a light most favorable to
Plaintiff. The propriety of such a dismissal is a question of law, and is reviewed for
correctness, giving no particular deference to the trial court.

This issue was

preserved for appeal by Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiff’s Opposition
to that Motions (R 64-65; 70-134;135-158).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES AT
ISSUE
The relevant portions of the Utah Code and Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are
included in an Addendum hereto including:
Utah Code Ann., § 78B-9-401, et seq. , the Postconviction Determination of Factual
Innocence.
Rule 12(b)(6) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

2

Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the Order and Judgment of the Third District Court, Salt
Lake City Department, Salt Lake County, granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
for failure to state a cause of action, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) U.R.C.P. This is an
action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78B-9-402 seeking compensation for
imprisonment, due to actual innocence. Plaintiff was previously convicted of
aggravated robbery, pursuant to Utah code Ann. § 76-3-302, a first degree felony.
That conviction was reversed; and all charges were dismissed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
References herein are to the Record of this Case, No. 080907781 (R.), and to the
Record of the previous criminal case, No. 031901163FS (R2.)
Petitioner was arrested on February 11, 2003; and was charged in the Third
District Court with the crime of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, on or about
February 18, 2003, in Case No. 031901163FS. (R2. 1-6). He was remanded to the
custody of the Salt Lake County Sheriff on that date. The Information alleged that the
crime was committed in Salt Lake County on or about December 8, 2000. (R2. 3).

3

Petitioner was tried by jury on the felony charge of aggravated robbery on
December 16, 2003 (R2. 35-36). At trial, Defendant claimed an alibi defense, but
was the only witness to that fact. He testified that he had previously lived in Utah;
but lived in Donaldsonville, LA at the time of the crime, and had been living there
since 1999. He testified that he had had a stroke in late November, 2000, and had
to take some time off work. (R2 162-163). The parties entered into a written
stipulation, to be read at trial, that Mr. Miller had been admitted to the River West
Medical Center in Louisiana on November 25, 2000 for a “cerebrovascular accident”
(a stroke) . He was employed by Ten M Corp in Donaldsonville, LA. from May 2000
until February, 2002, and had taken medical leave from November 25 until December
13, 2000. (R2. 40). He also testified that he returned to Utah, where he had lived
from 1989 to 1999, in February, 2002.
Petitioner was convicted; and on February 9, 2004, he was sentenced to a term
in the Utah State Prison of from five years to life (R2 135-139). Mr. Miller was
incarcerated at the Utah State Prison, or the Salt Lake County jail, from February
2004 until his release on July 6, 2007, when the Court dismissed all charges against
him, on the Motion of the Salt Lake District Attorney.
Petitioner appealed his conviction to this Court under Case No. 20040150(R2.
4

156). On February 7, 2005, his appellate counsel filed a Motion to Remand the
matter to the District Court to enter findings concerning Petitioner’s claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. His appellate counsel argued that other alibi
witnesses could have, and should have, been obtained, including Defendant’s niece,
Berthella Miller, who would testify that Defendant was living with her and
Defendant’s sister, after the stroke, and that she saw him daily during this period of
time. (R2. 160-168). Berthella filed an affidavit with the Court to this effect. (R2.
211-212). Also, Beverly Kolder, a registered nurse who provided home care to
Defendant, filed an affidavit with the Court in support of the Motion. That affidavit
stated that she visited Mr. Miller in Donaldsonville on December 7, 2000 and again
on December 14, 2000. An assessment produced by the nurse on December 14, 2000,
included the statement: “Able to ride in a car only when driven by another person OR
able to use a bus or handicap van only when assisted or accompanied by another
person.” (R2 172-186). Neither had been contacted by Defendant’s trial attorney.
Defendant’s sister, Paula Miller, was contacted by Defense counsel prior to the
trial, but she was unwilling to come to trial, because of other family problems in
Louisiana. She filed an affidavit with the Court that Mr. Miller had lived with her
after he was released from the hospital on November 28, 2000, and had returned to
5

work on December 13, 2000. She stated that he did not leave the State during that
time, and that she believed he would not have been physically able to travel long
distances. (R2. 234-236). There were also Court records from Louisiana indicating
that Defendant had appeared in Court in Ascension Parish Court, State of Louisiana
on December 5, 2000 for fishing without a license. (R2. 208).
The victim, on the other hand, was sure that Defendant was the one who robbed
her, despite the fact that it had been over two years since the robbery, when she
identified him from a photo line up and an in-person lineup. (R2. 158 p. 65-66; 94).
She had, however, seen black men she thought might be the robber a few other times,
but had never been sure (R2. 158 P. 68). Her identification was supported by the
store clerk at the Stop n’ Go outside of which the robbery had occurred, who stated
that he had seen the Defendant around the store “every now and then” prior to the
date of the robbery, and specifically stated that he was able to identify Defendant
because of his prior contacts with him. (R2. 158 p. 96-97). The sightings, “several
times”, were between July and December, 2000 as he had only started working there
in July. (R2. 158 p. 98-99).
See also the narrative report by Sgt. Charles Oliver, of an interview with the
store clerk who provided the second identification of Mr. Miller, from a photo lineup
6

shown him on October 24, 2003, almost three years after the incident. While the
clerk picked Mr. Miller out of the photo spread, the report also states: “Mr. Nissan
states that he knew the black male as a customer who came into the store once in a
while. He states he did not know his name but just recognized him as a customer.”(R.
151). See also the e-mail exchange between Gretchen Havner and Kent Morgan,
Assistant Justice Division Director and a man known for his determination to convict
criminals, only a week or so before the State moved to dismiss the charges:
Kent Morgan: I am reviewing the file . . . thus far, I see this as only a single
eyewitness identification case with no corroboration. . .if I find no
corroborative evidence . . .I think I will be letting this case go . . .I have some
concern that a third person identified your client as a former customer.
(Emphasis added).
Gretchen Havner: The reason I believe the store clerk is mistaken about
Harry’s identity is we can show Harry was employed by 10M Corporation in
Donaldsonville, Louisiana, from the end of May 2000 until February 2002.
Therefore, he wouldn’t have been in Salt Lake City to be a regular customer
at the store leading up to the date of the incident. (R. 156).
On or about April 26, 2005, the Court ordered the matter remanded to the
District Court for additional factual findings regarding the claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, pursuant to Rule 23B of the Rules of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. The order stated that it was for the purpose of allowing the
“Third District Court to conduct hearings and take evidence as necessary to enter
7

findings of fact necessary to determine the following claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel”.
On February 1, 2006, the matter was returned to the Court of Appeals, after
additional facts were determined. No finding was made of ineffective assistance of
counsel.
The appeal was scheduled for oral arguments before this Court on January 22,
2007. On or about January 18, 2007, the parties filed a Stipulated Motion for
Summary Reversal; and on the day set for oral arguments, this Court dismissed the
appeal and remanded the case to this Court for a new trial.
A retrial was scheduled for July 12, 2007. On July 5, 2007, the Salt Lake
District Attorney notified the District Court that it would not be going forward to trial
on the assigned date, and filed a Motion to Dismiss. On July 6, 2007, the trial Court
signed the Order dismissing all charges, “in the interest of justice”. Defendant
dismissed was released from custody the same day.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Petitioner’s Petitioner, brought under the recent legislation providing for
compensation to those unjustly convicted and imprisoned, alleges sufficient facts to
defeat Defendant’s Motion, under Rule 12(b)(6) U.R.C.P. to dismiss, based on the
8

failure to State a cause of action. The allegations, if true, show that Defendant is
highly unlikely to have committed the crime with which he was charged, and of
which he was previously convicted.
Further, the trial Court erred in its standard of review. First, it should have
reviewed the Petition in light of the reversal of the conviction, ad the dismissal of the
criminal charges. Second, it should not have relied on the factors set out in Utah
Code Ann. § 78B-9-402 (2)(a), as those requirements do not apply to petitions
brought under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-402 (b). The search here should be for
justice, not for a slavish adherence to form.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
ASSUMING THE ALLEGATIONS TO BE TRUE, PETITIONER HAS ALLEGED
ADEQUATE FACTS TO REQUIRE THE COURT TO HOLD AN EVIDENTIARY
HEARING ON THE QUESTION OF ACTUAL INNOCENCE.
This is a Petition to determine factual innocence, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78B-9-401. This Petition is brought pursuant to Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. This Petition was filed within one year of the date that retrial was
scheduled, and upon which this Court ordered all charges dismissed. Further, this
Petition was filed promptly upon jurisdiction being conferred on the District Court
9

to determine factual innocence, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-401 et seq.,
effective May 5, 2008. In its 2008 general session, the Utah legislature passed Utah
Code Ann., previously designated as §78-35a-401, et seq. and now recodified as §
78B-9-401 et seq. , entitled “Postconviction Determination of Factual Innocence”.
The act provides for the filing of a Petition, similar to that provided for by the PostConviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-101, et seq., and subject to the
provisions of Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as to form and content.
A Petition is to be filed in the District Court having jurisdiction over the matter, and
shall request a hearing to determine factual innocence. The Petitioner may allege
“newly discovered evidence that establishes that the petitioner is factually innocent.”
It should be sufficient, in conjunction with other evidence, to establish factual
innocence. Petitioner claims that there is substantial new evidence which defense
counsel did not produce at trial.

In the alternative, Petitioner asserts that the

evidence taken as a whole shows factual innocence, and no other finding is necessary.
Therefore, Petitioner alleges that this matter should have been set for hearing to
determine factual innocence.
The trial Court granted Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss this action pursuant
to Rules 12(b)(6) and 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b)(6) allows
10

a Motion to Dismiss based on the failure to State a cause of action. According to the
Utah Supreme Court, in Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah 1995):
“A rule 12(b)(6) Motion to dismiss admits the facts alleged in the complaint
but challenges the Plaintiff’s right to relief based on those facts.” In
determining whether a trial Court properly granted a Motion to dismiss under
rule 12(b)(6), we accept the factual allegations as true and consider them and
all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them in a light most favorable to the
Plaintiff. (Internal citations omitted) (Emphasis added).
At this point, Petitioner does not need to prove factual innocence. He only needs to
show that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on that allegation. The State, on the
other hand, in order to sustain the dismissal, must show that, even if all the
allegations are true, there is no reason to have such a hearing, as the allegations are
insufficient in themselves. The burden of proof at the evidentiary hearing is not now
important. Certainly, the strong evidence of alibi defense, the poor quality of the eye
witness identification, and the nonsensical conclusions relied upon to show guilt are
sufficient to get past Rule 12(b)(6) U.R.C.P.
Petitioner’s appellate attorney, in the closing paragraph of his Reply Brief to
this Court , on direct appeal, summed up the original conviction:
Here, the result was so unreliable as to approach the absurd. To propose that
a man who lived and was gainfully employed in a small Louisiana town would
– after being disabled by a stroke – somehow travel over 1800 miles without
any of his caretakers knowing about it, immediately commit a random crime
11

against a stranger with negligible gain, and get himself home without anyone
noticing his absence defies logic.
Petitioner has always maintained that he was in the State of Louisiana on the
day when the crime was committed, and so testified at trial. Prior to the remand,
additional testimony as to an alibi defense was obtained, which had not been available
at the original trial. Petitioner claims factual innocence by virtue of his alibi defense,
and the high degree of certainty that he was not present at the time and place the
offense was committed. Mr. Miller would have had to fly to Utah on December 7th,
almost immediately after his nursing appointment, commit the crime, and return to
Louisiana shortly thereafter. The nurse’s comments show that he was not in physical
shape to do so. No evidence has been produced whatsoever that such a trip was
made. While some suggestion has been made that he came out to see his brother, his
brother gave a statement to the police indicating that he had seen the Defendant for
some time. His caretakers did not notice his absence; and given the tight timeline,
such a visit makes little sense.
The previous remand to the District Court was not to determine innocence, but
instead to determine whether trial counsel met the minimum standard necessary to
fulfill his legal duty to defend the Defendant in court. This Court’s remand order ,
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however, also included the instruction: “If trial counsel’s performance is found to be
deficient, the prejudicial effect, if any, of the deficient performance on the outcome
of the trial.” (R2. 253). In addressing that issue, the trial Court did review certain
newly discovered facts that had not been introduced as evidence at trial. The most
important items of evidence were the the testimony of Berthella Miller, Defendant’s
niece; and the affidavits of Beverly Kolder, a home health care nurse assigned to
assist Mr. Miller while he recuperated from a stroke suffered in late November.
There were also affidavits submitted by Melissa Landry, the interim director of River
West Home Care, as to the dates of care provided by the agency, and Defendant’s
sister, Paula Miller.
Berthella Miller testified personally that she had seen him every day during
the three weeks he was out of work due to his illness. The Court found that there were
many factors involved in counsel’s inability to obtain all the witnesses and
information needed to present the alibi defense. He had incomplete information about
the home health care agency. He was able to contact Defendant’s sister, Paula, but
he was unable to convince her, because of other family problems, to come to Utah to
testify. He was not told of Berthella, the niece, and did not get in touch with her. He
reasonably believed that the alibi case was strong , based on the stipulation and the
13

testimony of Mr. Miller. (R2. 596-609). The Court made the following findings
about the witnesses who had not been called by defense counsel at trial:
53.

Berthella made inconsistent statements and had a poor memory of
defendant’s stroke. The Court therefore finds that her testimony was, at
best, not reliable and that she would not have been a credible witness at
Defendant’s trial.

58.

Evidence from the home health care nurse concerning the dates of her
visits to defendant would have narrowed the window of time that
defendant could have been gone from Louisiana, but would not have
provided an alibi for the date of the crime on December 8, 2000

59.

Evidence from the home health care nurse fails to establish a reasonable
probability of a different outcome at trial.

60.

Because of her inconsistent statements and lack of memory about crucial
information, testimony from Berthella Miller at the evidentiary hearing
was not credible. If her testimony had been presented at trial, it would
have been weighed against all of the other facts, testimony, and evidence
presented at trial, including the credible testimony of the victim and the
second eye-witness.

61.

Testimony from Berthella Miller fails to establish a reasonable
probability of a different outcome at trial. (R2. 606-607).

The affidavit of Ms. Kolder firmly placed Mr. Miller in Donaldsonville, Louisiana the
day before the robbery, the visit having concluded at 11:02 AM on that day. The
Court responded that “Defendant could have traveled by airplane from Louisiana to
Utah on December 7, 2005 [should be 2000]”. (R2. 600). While that is true, of
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course, it should be rather obvious that the scenario is highly unlikely. Mr. Miller
does not travel by plane.

Even though members of the UACDL and others

contributed to a fund to help him get back to Louisiana after he was released, he
never considered a plane, but instead took the bus. The State’s brief, filed in the
Court of Appeals, referred to the period of time that Mr. Miller was out of work from
November 28 through December 13 to recuperate from the stroke, and suggested that
“this time gap allowed Defendant time to travel to Salt Lake City to visit his brother,
commit the robbery, and return to Louisiana.” (P. 8)(Emphasis added). The logistics
of getting to Salt Lake City in time to commit this crime make it nearly impossible.
If Mr. Miller had driven, it would have taken over 27 hours, something not possible
to do in time, even assuming he could physically have made such a trip. If he had
flown, he would have to have driven to New Orleans, a trip of about one and a half
hours, gotten on a plane, paid extra to fly direct, and POSSIBLY made it in eight
hours. For what purpose, to rob somebody of a few dollars and then fly back in time
to go back to work, and for his next home nursing visit? Nobody has ever attempted
to plot out what planes he would have taken, and whether the planes actually did
arrive on time.
The trial Court found that trial counsel there was not deficient regarding the
15

home health care nurse, “because defendant failed to provide him with information
to locate this witness, and because evidence from this witness does not establish an
alibi for the date of the crime.” Regarding the testimony of Petitioner’s niece, there
was no deficiency “because counsel was unaware that Berthella had any relevant
information, defendant failed to tell him that Berthella might have been a helpful
witness, and defendant failed to provide him with information to locate this witness.”
The Court went on to state that, even assuming that the two witnesses had testified,
“there is no reasonable probability of a different result” at trial, due most importantly
to “the credibility of the two eye witnesses who testified at trial.” (R2. 608-609).
In making its previous findings, the Court made its own determination of the
credibility of the witnesses and potential witnesses. The Court, in particular,
discounted the testimony of Bethella Miller, as her memory was not sharp, and details
were lacking. This is not surprising, in light of the fact that the incident at issue was
then over five years old. The State, in its Motion below, also points out that
Petitioner’s evidence “must be weighed against the State’s two credible eyewitnesses
who have repeatedly identified petitioner as the robber.” (R. 77). The Court appears
to have relied upon its previous findings, in its ruling here granting the Motion to
Dismiss. So, both the Court and the State were in error, in relying on assertions of
16

credibility. For purposes of a Motion under Rule 12(b)(6). Credibility is not at issue;
nor is the relative weight of the “State’s two credible eyewitnesses”. See again
Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah 1995): “In determining whether
a trial Court properly granted a Motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6), we accept the
factual allegations as true and consider them and all reasonable inferences to be
drawn from them in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff.”
In referring to those “credible” witnesses, the State seems to be taking the
position that their testimony has some strong weight, because it was sufficient to
convict, before that conviction was overturned. When reviewed in conjunction with
later discovered evidence, that evidence, given some three years after the robbery, is
NOT all that credible. By the time the date set for retrial approached, it appears that
the corroborating testimony of Mr. Nissen had been totally discredited. The case was
weakened to the point that the charges were dropped. It is disingenuous at this point
to make the claim that the State’s case is so strong that no hearing on innocence
should even be held.
POINT II
THE LAW SHOULD BE READ TO GIVE EVERY CHANCE TO AN INNOCENT
PERSON TO BE COMPENSATED FOR UNJUSTIFIED IMPRISONMENT.

17

Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure applies to “Post-conviction
relief.” It was promulgated before the Postconviction Determination of Innocence
Act was passed, and does not contemplate its use here. However, the Rule does
prescribe the procedure for a Petition, which states the grounds for relief and the
allegations that need to be made. The Rule is designed for someone who is
attempting to remove a conviction which is still on the record. It does not speak to
the situation where there is no conviction. Nevertheless, the procedures of the Rule
have been followed, including the Petition, the attachments and the supporting
memorandum. The rule allows for summary dismissal of the Petition, if the Petition
is frivolous on its face, or if it does not support a claim for relief, as a matter of law.
In this regard, it tracks Rule 12(b)(6) U.R.C.P., but does not add to it. This Petition
is not frivolous; and it does not fail to State a cause of action as a matter of law. The
allegations are sufficient, if believed, to show that the Petitioner is factually innocent.
Thus, the petition is sufficient under the rule.
This is the very first case brought under the new law. This new law, which
allows for compensation to someone who has been imprisoned for something he did
not do, is in the same chapter of the code as the Post Conviction Remedies Act. It
reflects some of the same policy considerations, and contains some of the same
18

limitations. But there is a fundamental difference in the proceedings, which the State
and the trial Court did not acknowledge. The Post Conviction Remedies Act will
only be used by someone who has been finally convicted of a crime and is seeking
relief from that conviction. Because that person has already had a constitutional right
to an appeal (Constitution of Utah, Art. VIII, § 5) the right to bring post-conviction
proceedings is limited to situations where the appeal did not vindicate the right of the
criminal Defendant to due process of law. Such a case would not be brought if the
appeal were successful. Therefore, the requirements include that there be new
evidence which could not, with reasonable diligence have been discovered in time to
be included in post trial motions, and the appellate process. An exception is made
when counsel for Defendant in the underlying criminal proceedings was found to be
ineffective. While there was a claim made on Petitioner’s direct appeal that trial
counsel was ineffective, and while that claim was not upheld, the appeal was
successful. Counsel for the State downplays that fact in saying:
Although both parties agreed that there was “an error in the trial proceedings”
and petitioner’s conviction was accordingly reversed, the nature of the error is
not stated and therefore this unspecified error cannot be the basis for ordering
a hearing for factual innocence. (R.78-79). (Emphasis added).
It once again approaches the absurd to read this statute not to favor compensation
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where the conviction has been reversed on appeal, and the case has been dismissed.
We now know that Mr. Miller was incarcerated for something of which he is
presumed innocent. The law should not be read to prevent his compensation under
these circumstances.
The State opened its memorandum below with a recitation of the requirements
of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-402(2)(a). Those include that there is new evidence, that
the evidence is not merely cumulative of what was known at the time of trial, and that
the evidence shows that Defendant is factually innocent. Part of the statute referred
to by the State reads:
(vi)(A) neither the petitioner nor the petitioner’s counsel knew of the evidence
at the time of trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any
previously filed post-trial Motion or post conviction motion, and the evidence
could not have been discovered by the petitioner or the petitioner’s counsel
through the exercise of reasonable diligence.
However, the new law (Utah Code Ann § 78B-9-402(2)(a)(vi)(A))allows the Court
to waive the necessity of either showing that the evidence could not have been known
at trial, or that counsel was ineffective, in the interest of justice. On the face of it, a
person who has had his conviction reversed seems to have no advantage over the
person who filed this Petition from his prison cell; but that does not make sense. The
act mimics the “Post-Conviction Remedies Act”, in requiring, in § 78B-9-402((2)(a)
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that “the petitioner identifies the specific evidence the petitioner claims establishes
innocence”. But, see Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-402(2)((b):
A person who has already obtained postconviction relief that vacated or
reversed the person’s conviction may also file a petition under this part if no
retrial or appeal regarding this offense is pending. (Emphasis added).
Petitioner contends that this language does, in fact, grant some advantage to the
person who no longer has a conviction. He may “also file a petition”; but he is not
specifically restrained by the language of § 78B-9-402((2)(a). This is a separate and
distinct part of the statute, which can stand on its own without any reference to
subparagraph (a). Why should the Petitioner here be required to show that the
information regarding innocence was unknown to him or his counsel at the original
trial, if the results of that trial did not stand? If he had gone to retrial, could he not
have introduced all available evidence of his innocence, regardless of when and how
it was discovered? What interest does the State now have in defending the result of
the original trial, which has now been discredited? The purpose of this statute is to
compensate the person who has been unjustly punished for something it now appears
he did not do. Further, the statute, in requiring proof of actual innocence, prevents
compensation to someone who has prevailed because evidence of his guilt has been
suppressed as wrongfully seized. But this is not such a case. Here, after trial, the
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evidence of innocence continued to build until the State agreed to a summary reversal
of the guilty verdict, not based on a “technicality”, but because it no longer appeared
that the evidence, taken as a whole, could support the verdict. Then, the State took
the additional step of moving to dismiss the charges and release the Defendant from
jail,”in the interest of justice”. And all of this occurred after the trial Judge had found
the evidence insufficient to support the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
The same trial Judge rejected the cumulative evidence of innocence in the context of
this Petition, based on her previous decision, which, the parties have stipulated,
stopped short of doing justice. The trial Judge reviewed this Petition using the
wrong standard. The petition, having been filed after the momentous events
involving the dismissal, deserved and required a truly de novo review. What it
received was an improper deference to a previously discredited ruling: “the Court
reviewed this evidence as part of a remand from the court of appeals and determined
that there was ‘no reasonable probability of a different result even if [the new
witnesses] had testified.’” (R. 172).
Petitioner contends that the State and the trial Court erred in their contention
that this statute should be limited in its relief to the trial which resulted in the
conviction. In the end, the State refused to take this case to retrial, based on newly
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discovered weaknesses in the evidence, These facts do not now stand as having been
proved. The conviction was reversed, based on the serious questions raised by newly
discovered facts. The “credibility of the two eye witnesses who testified at trial” was
seriously questioned by both sides in this litigation. Contrary to the State’s assertions
here, there is now a very strong presumption of innocence. The State very rarely
concedes that a trial reached such an unfair result that it must be summarily reversed.
The State now contends that nothing can be read into that stipulation. This was a
very serious move, and a great deal must be read into it. The trial Court erred
seriously in assuming that the case was in a similar posture on this petition to where
it was on the remand from this Court. At that time, the trial Court looked at the case
with the knowledge of a conviction, and determined whether there were obvious
mistakes which were serious enough to set aside the conviction. On this Petition, the
Court should have looked at the case with the knowledge that it had been wrong the
first time. There were, in fact, errors serious enough to justify reversal. The State
should get no comfort or support in the claim that no one can know what those errors
were. We have seen them; and they have justified reversal. The State now asks this
Court to affirm the trial Court’s error in failing to understand the completely new
posture of this case.. It still may be true that Defendant could conceivably have
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gotten on an airplane, come out to Utah, and robbed a stranger for a few dollars,
nowhere near enough to pay for the airplane ticket; but at this point, everyone must
concede that this does not make sense.
The ruling of the trial Court, by the Judge who presided over the trial, and also
reviewed the record for evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel, is harsh and
illogical in its conclusions:
First, it is apparent from the record that Petitioner cannot meet either
subsection (vi)(A) or (vi)(B). Specifically, Petitioner was aware of the
substance of this evidence at the time of trial and it was all presented to his
appellate counsel for purposes of making ineffective assistance of counsel
claims on appeal. Additionally, the Court found that trial counsel was not
ineffective. Although the Court could waive either or both of these
requirements in the interest of justice, the Court finds that Petitioner has not
met other prongs of 78B-9-402. (Emphasis in original).
Petitioner has not shown that the evidence, upon which he seeks to rely, is not
cumulative of evidence presented at trial. Petitioner presented his alibi defense
at trial. These additional witnesses would have served only to bolster his
testimony, not to present a wholly new assertion. (R. 172).
As pointed out above, Petitioner should not have to comply with those subsections,
as those only apply to someone who still has a conviction. The Court notes that she
reviewed the new evidence upon remand from the Court of Appeals, and found
counsel not to have been ineffective; and she ends the inquiry there. She reviewed
the evidence and made the decision that a reasonable jury would likely have
24

convicted anyway, even if they had known of the new evidence that was now before
her. She applied the “harmless error” rule, that an error committed which would not
likely have changed the outcome, does not justify a reversal. See State v. Adams,
2000 UT 42, 5 P.3d 642 (Ut 2000). But she ignored the fact, that these facts clearly
did justify a reversal.
Under the circumstances, the State was simply wrong in its assertion below
that “should a hearing be granted, the burden of proof as to petitioner’s factual
innocence does not lie with the State.” (R. 77). The State must indeed bear some
burden to overcome the presumption of innocence. The State, lamely pointed out that
“this Court has already found that petitioner ‘could have traveled by airplane from
Louisiana in December 7, 2005 [again, should be 2000].” (Emphasis added). In
another place in its memorandum, the State made the point with even less force: “it
still remains possible for petitioner to have committed the crime”. (Emphasis added)
(R. 76). The State then made this giant leap of faith: “The State respectfully submits
that no bona fide issue exists in this case as to whether the petitioner is factually
innocent”. The State did not even try to prove the case against Defendant, after its
original case had unraveled. Therefore, there really is “no bona fide issue” as to
Petitioner’s innocence.
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Near the end of its memorandum: “The State maintains that there is no
compelling interest of justice that requires that a factual innocence hearing now be
granted to petitioner in this case.” (R. 78). That statement conveys total indifference
as to whether an innocent man has been unjustly punished, and punished severely.
The Court of Appeals, in State v. Todd, 2007 UT App 349, 173 P.3d 170 (Utah App.
2007) explained the role of the prosecuting attorney in criminal cases:
In our judicial system, “the prosecution’s responsibility is that of a “minister
of justice and not simply that of an advocate”, which includes a duty “to see
that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon
the basis of sufficient evidence.’” ¶ 17. (Internal citations omitted).
The State’s position is that a petitioner, who was imprisoned for over four years for
a crime that has been dismissed for lack of evidence, does not have a claim which
arises to the level of the “compelling interest of justice”. The State’s attorneys are
abdicating their responsibility as “ministers of justice”. The United States Supreme
Court recently expanded the requirement that counsel be furnished to a criminal
Defendant at the very beginning of the criminal proceeding, in order to avoid a
miscarriage of justice. In the case of Rothgery v. Gillespie County, Case No. 07-440
(June 23, 2008), the Court reinstated a civil lawsuit for denial of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, in a case involving an erroneous arrest. Defendant there
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was arrested and jailed for a period of time as a felon in possession of a firearm.
Counsel was not immediately appointed to represent him. When counsel was
appointed, it was determined that the arrest was as a result of a faulty computer entry
regarding the former felony. Clearly the Supreme Court, seeing that this innocent
man was jailed without a fair chance to show his innocence, found this to be a case
of a “compelling interest of justice”.
In light of all this, the conclusion of the trial Court is nothing less than chilling
in its failure to recognize the importance of the underlying search for justice:
Finally Petitioner cannot show that this evidence would “establish” that he was
innocent. Although the evidence makes it unlikely that Petitioner committed
the crime, the Court reviewed this evidence as part of a remand from the court
of appeals and determined that there was “no reasonable probability of a
different outcome at trial if [the new witnesses] had testified.” (Emphasis
added). (R. 172).
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-405 provides that, upon a finding of factual
innocence, the Petitioner shall be paid a sum equal to “the monetary equivalent of the
average annual nonagricultural payroll wage in Utah, as determined by the data most
recently published by the Department of Workforce Services at the time of the
petitioner’s release from prison” for the time he spent incarcerated in this matter.
Petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing without a preconceived determination.
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Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to compensation, and requests that this amount be
determined, after the finding of factual innocence.
CONCLUSION
This case is before this Court on review of the dismissal of Petioner’s Petition
under Rule 12(b)(6) U.R.C.P., which allows a dismissal for failure to State a cause
of action upon which relief may be granted. Petitioners’ Petition does, in fact allege
sufficient facts to require an evidentiary hearing on innocence, and to defeat such a
Motion. The dismissal should be reversed, and the matter should be remanded to the
District Court for an evidentiary hearing.
DATED this ___ day of January, 2009.
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH, L.L.C.

_____________________________________
W. Andrew McCullough
Attorney for Appellant
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